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Thesis directed by Professor William Boyd 
  
 Climate change policy at the national and international level has met with significant 
resistance, and sub-national cap and trade programs in the United States are being 
implemented in their stead. However, these sub-national policies face significant 
inefficiencies because they must “imperfectly” map cap and trade programs onto a small 
subsector of a nationally connected economy. Policymakers cannot avoid the expense of 
extensive administrative resources upfront to battle such inefficiencies without sacrificing 
the program’s structural and environmental integrity once in operation. This is 
demonstrated in this paper through an analysis of policies to battle emissions leakage in 
the electricity sector, where increased electricity prices under the sub-national cap and 
trade program could cause increased use of dirtier, cheaper electricity generation outside of 
the cap. Emissions leakage is an unfortunate but important consequence of overlaying a cap 
and trade program on top of an extremely interconnected national electricity grid. The 
amount of resources expended to create policy that anticipates emissions leakage issues 
must be determined through a difficult and value-laden balancing of administrative 
efficiency and environmental integrity, and should be guided by precaution. This is 
especially true because the sub-national policymakers are creating climate change 
programs in the face of significant jurisdictional, efficiency, and technical hurdles. Two case 
studies are specifically highlighted in examining emissions leakage policies for sub-national 
programs: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) and California’s Proposed 
Regulation to Implement a California Cap and Trade Program. RGGI’s usage of a passive 
approach to emissions leakage policy is contrasted against California’s proactive, resource-
intensive approach. The paper uses these case studies to help guide a sub-national 
policymaker’s decisionmaking process by highlighting the difficulties inherent for a sub-
national program, the precaution requisite in balancing administrative resources against 
environmental integrity, and the possible consequences of a passive versus proactive 
approach to emission leakage. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sub-national climate change programs are becoming more prevalent in the United 
States, in part as a reaction to global and national standstill on climate change policy1, and 
in some cases simply as an effort to lead efforts in implementation of climate change 
programs. These sub-national programs are acting as the nation’s laboratory by enacting 
policies that are “imperfect” in scale or coverage. The imperfectness in coverage forces these 
programs to address the effects of imposing sub-national programs onto an interconnected 
nation.  These programs face inefficiencies - it is relatively well-settled among economists 
that a broader, more integrated program would capture greater efficiencies in emissions 
and cost reductions. Thus, policymakers at the sub-national level cannot simply create a 
cap and trade program and expect it to be successful at achieving emissions reductions and 
at operating an efficient marketplace.  Instead, sub-national policymakers must brace for a 
significant investment in administrative time and resources upfront in order to better 
ensure the environmental and structural integrity of the program. This is made especially 
clear through an examination of emissions leakage in the electricity sector, where increases 
                                                          
1 Witness the inability of the recent Cancun Agreements to gain binding commitments or agreement 
on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, following on the heels of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
incapacity to achieve its goal in reductions of global emissions. United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. on its 15th Sess., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, Decision -
/CP.16, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGCLA/2010/CRP.1 (Advanced unedited version);  FULVIO CONTI, 
HARVARD PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, TOWARD A POST-2012 INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE AGREEMENT (2010). Further, efforts to create a comprehensive cap and trade market on the 
national level in the United States have failed. See, e.g., Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. 
(2007), which was ultimately stopped after six months in the Senate; American Clean Energy and 
Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Congress (2009), which passed the House but did not pass the Senate; 
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Congress (2009), which passed 
Committee but was not passed by the Senate; and the American Power Act, S. ____, 111th Cong. § 
756(c) (as circulated in draft form May 12, 2010), which was introduced in May and has not been 
passed in the Senate. (Note that international efforts to battle greenhouse gas emissions began 
largely with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its resultant 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction treaty, the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., art. 2(1), 
Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1.) 
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in carbon prices under sub-national cap and trade programs can cause dirtier, cheaper 
generation resources outside of the cap to capture more market power in the region and 
affect true emissions reductions of the program.  This problem specially affects the 
electricity sector because application of a cap and trade program to a subset of the nation’s 
highly interconnected electricity grid creates significant obstacles in relation to policy 
structure and jurisdiction.  
Two case studies on this subject are specifically enlightening to demonstrate the 
difficulties in enacting sub-national cap and trade programs that can prevent or keep 
emissions leakage to a minimum.  First, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) 
is helpful in examining a program that enacted a very passive approach to emissions 
leakage with a focus more on monitoring the problem. Second, California’s Proposed 
Regulation to Implement the California Cap and Trade Program assists a discussion of a 
program that utilizes heavy administrative resources upfront to proactively address 
emissions leakage issues.  
 This paper attempts to outline the import of sub-national policymakers’ decisions 
regarding emissions leakage before cap and trade programs are put in place through 
examining the structure, background, and possible effects of RGGI and California’s 
approaches to emissions leakage in the electricity sector. The paper begins with background 
information on electricity markets, carbon markets, and emissions leakage. It then 
proceeds to an overview of the general dilemma of a sub-national policymaker in 
implementing a cap and trade program that can effectively deal with emissions leakage 
problems. RGGI is introduced as the first of two case studies on emissions leakage policies. 
It is the nation’s only non-voluntary cap and trade market in place, and acts as a study in a 
passive approach to emissions leakage. The paper contrasts this case study with a detailed 
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analysis of California’s Proposed Regulation to Implement the California Cap and Trade 
Program, which instead utilizes a very proactive approach to emissions leakage.  
 The paper ends with the conclusion that policymakers constructing an “incomplete” 
or sub-national cap and trade program cannot avoid the expense of extensive resources 
upfront without possibly sacrificing the program’s structural and environmental integrity 
once in operation. This is an unfortunate but important consequence of overlaying a cap 
and trade program on top of an extremely interconnected national electricity grid. The 
amount of resources expended must be determined through a difficult and value-laden 
balancing of administrative efficiency and environmental integrity, but should be guided by 
precaution. This is especially true because the sub-national policymakers are creating 
climate change programs in the face of significant jurisdictional and technical hurdles (as 
California is experiencing currently).  Further, because the sub-national cap and trade 
program is already battling inefficiencies by its incomplete regulatory nature, it is 
imperative that policymakers utilize resources upfront to ensure that the program does not 
produce more inefficiency through emissions leakage once the program is in operation. This 
paper contributes to the sub-national policymaker’s decisionmaking by highlighting the 
difficulties inherent for a sub-national program, the precaution requisite in balancing 
administrative resources against environmental integrity, and the possible consequences of 
a passive versus proactive approach to emission leakage. 
II. ELECTRICITY MARKETS OVERVIEW  
In order to better understand the intricate issues associated with the creation of 
sub-national cap and trade markets, a broad background of electricity markets must be first 
explained.  The electricity markets in the United States can be divided into three categories 
of services provided: generation, transmission, and distribution.  
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 Generation plants can be divided into three basic categories: 1. Base load plants that 
have low fuel costs and cannot be turned off and on rapidly (usually coal, nuclear, or 
occasionally hydro); 2. Intermediate load plants, which are more costly to operate but can 
be used as “spinning reserves” , ramping up and down quickly to balance load and 
generation, or helping out with unscheduled outages (usually natural gas, or hydro); and 3. 
Peaking plants, which may have high operating costs but can be turned on and off quickly 
(usually natural gas or hydro). 2 Emissions leakage often occurs when dirtier generation 
sources (like coal) outside of the cap capture more market power of generation and cleaner 
sources (like natural gas or renewables) within the cap capture less market power. As 
discussed infra, California’s calculation of a default emissions factor based on intermediate 
and peaking power on California’s spot market but used for dirtier coal power might be 
problematic.  
Because electricity cannot be easily stored, the generation load on the grid must 
constantly be carefully balanced to meet the demand. This is done as best as possible 
through a transmission network of lines, distribution centers, and control systems. 
However, “control” of electricity is minimal - when power is injected into a transmission 
line, it flows through the entire network, not just to a point where the control operator 
wishes it to go.3  This means that it is close to impossible to “control” emissions leakage 
from a transmission network point of view. Thus, policies are used instead that track the 
generation through contracts or through spot market transactions. 
Transmission networks help connect generation sources to distribution networks. 
Together, these three sectors create an electricity “grid”. The United States has a highly 
                                                          
2 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Wind Systems Integration Basics, 
http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/system_integration_basics.html. 
3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING 
OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 4.5 (2002). 
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interconnected electricity grid – some have coined it as the “largest interconnected machine 
on Earth” with 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines and 5.5 million miles of 
local distribution lines linking thousands of generation plants to end users.4 The 
transmission systems of the United States are divided into three large networks: 1. The 
Western Interconnection, governed by the Western Systems Coordinating Council; 2. The 
Texas Interconnection, operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas; and 3. The 
Eastern Interconnection, managed by seven regional reliability councils.5 RGGI is located 
within the Eastern Connection, while California is located in the Western Interconnection. 
Transmission networks must be operated in a way that keeps voltage and frequency 
with very narrow limits, which requires the oversight of network operators. Further, as 
aforementioned, the physics of the grid is such that there is very little that grid operators 
can do to exercise control over the flow of electricity once it’s been put onto the grid.6 The 
necessity of electricity and the delicate requirements for management of transmission 
networks lead to the need for standards in operation of the networks. The standards for 
operation of transmission networks are set by the North American Electric Reliability 
Council.7 See Figure 2 in the Appendix for a map of these networks.  
Distribution is the final stage of electricity transportation from generation to the 
consumer. It occurs where electricity is “stepped down” through transformers from high 
voltage lines to lower voltage lines and carried to end consumers.  
Historically, generation, transmission, and distribution have been provided by the 
same entity – a “vertically-integrated” utility. However, increasingly, these services are 
                                                          
4Jennifer Weeks, U.S. Electrical Grid Undergoes Massive Transition to Connect to Renewables, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Apr. 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=what-is-the-smart-grid. 
5 Id.at 4.11-4.12. 
6 This is because electricity simply flows along the path of least resistance, so the electricity flows 
where it is most needed and is not so easily directed towards a certain geographic area. Id. 
7 Id. 4.11. 
6 
 
 
 
provided by different entities in order to provide a relatively competitive marketplace for 
the services. This involves both the wholesale (generation and transmission of bulk power) 
and retail (customer distribution and distributed sales of electricity) levels. Wholesale 
competition involves introducing competition amongst generators (e.g. through the 
introduction of independent power producers) and open access to transmission lines. Retail 
competition involves the ability for the customer to choose their generation provider. 
Emissions leakage issues are primarily concerned about how the wholesale power market 
maps onto the sub-national cap and trade markets.  
FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale rates and sales under the Federal Power Act8, 
while retail sales are generally under the jurisdiction of states and their associated public 
utility commissions. As discussed infra, this creates some concerns with California’s cap 
and trade market, where California could possibly be seen to be adding value to wholesale 
power brought into the state. Public utility commissions approve rates charged by utilities 
for electricity in a rate case, and the rate allowed is the “cost of service,” determined by the 
utility’s operating expenses, fixed costs, and a set rate of return.  
Restructuring of the electricity industry and the associated encouragement of 
wholesale competition in the electricity industry began with the 1978 Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policy Act (“PURPA”), in its requirement that utilities purchase or sell 
electricity from small power producers (“qualifying facilities”) at “avoided cost,” which 
incentivized the growth of an independent energy sector.9 Wholesale competition in 
transmission and generation was further incentivized in 1996, when the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issued Orders 888 & 889, which effectively restructured 
                                                          
8 See The Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 824. 
9 PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.  
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the electricity industry by requiring open access to transmission services and requiring the 
functional unbundling of transmission services for wholesale competition.10  
Although Order 888 did not mandate the formation of independent system operators 
(“ISO”) to operate the transmission system and facilitate open access, it did pave the way 
for them by suggesting the creation of an ISO as a way to provide non-discriminatory access 
to transmission. Soon after Orders 888 and 889, FERC issued Order 2000, codifying 
minimum characteristics, functions, and ratemaking policies regarding regional 
transmission organizations (“RTOs”), which also operates a transmission system, but has 
met the minimum characteristics in Order 2000 and petitioned FERC for RTO status.11 
There are currently three ISOs operating in the United States: 1. California ISO (“CAISO”); 
2. New York ISO (“NYISO”); and 3. Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”)12, and 
four RTOs: 1. PJM Interconnection (“PJM”); 2. Midwest Independent Transmission System 
Operator (“MISO”); 3. Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”); and 4. ISO New England (“ISONE”) 
(an RTO despite its name). 13 See Figure 3 in Appendix for a map of the existing ISOs/RTOs 
in the U.S. RGGI includes PJM, NYISO, and ISONE. California’s cap and trade market 
deals with its CAISO.  
Retail competition is state-specific, as it is under state jurisdiction. Many states 
have attempted to restructure their retail electricity markets by encouraging competition, 
but these attempts have not been extremely successful.14 Most of the Northeast states have 
active restructured retail markets, while California’s retail market has stalled after the 
                                                          
10 Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996); Order No. 889, 75 FERC ¶ 61,078 (1996). 
11 Order 2000,  89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999).  
12 See ISO/RTO Council, ISO RTO Operating Regions, 
http://www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2604471/k.B14E/Map.htm (Note that there are three 
ISOs in Canada as well: Alberta ISO (“AEISO”), Independent Electricity System Operator (“IESO”), 
and New Brunswick System Operator (“NBSO”)). 
13 See id. 
14 See, e.g. California’s experience in its retail competition plan, where its electricity industry 
collapsed under the attempt at restructuring. 
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collapse of its electricity industry in 2000-2001. California maintains an ISO and Power 
Exchange for day-ahead and hour-ahead electricity markets, and consumers can still 
“choose” retail suppliers, but the retail supplier choice is not meaningful and the market 
restructuring is currently delayed.15 
For the purposes of emissions leakage within the electricity sector under sub-
national cap and trade markets, issues arise primarily with how sub-national carbon 
markets overlay their cap and trade markets onto wholesale power markets, and how those 
policies affect choices and rates within the wholesale power markets. 
III. CARBON MARKETS OVERVIEW 
 Climate change is primarily caused by the release and subsequent accumulation of 
greenhouse gases into the Earth’s atmosphere.  Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas, and it 
accounts for approximately 77% of the total anthropogenic greenhouse gases present in the 
atmosphere.16  Due to carbon dioxide’s significant contribution to atmospheric greenhouse 
gases, efforts have increased worldwide to reduce carbon emissions.  Climate change is 
becoming more studied17, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that the 
Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions18, 
and the “vast majority of Americans (some 84%) now believe that global warming has been 
occurring” and would like the government to be “devoting substantial attention to 
addressing climate change.”19 In part due to this increased awareness of the damage from 
                                                          
15 See Energy Information Administration, California Restructuring Suspended, May, 2010 
http://ftp.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/california.html. 
16 EPA, Global Greenhouse Gas Data, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/globalghg.html 
(last visited June 1, 2010). 
17 See INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007 (AR4) (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml. 
18 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
19 BRENT BANNON ET AL., AMERICANS’ EVALUATION OF POLICIES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 1 (2007). 
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greenhouse gas emissions, the movement to implement a market-based program to reduce 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions is gaining tremendous momentum.  Cap 
and trade markets are an important component of efforts to mitigate such concerns about 
greenhouse gas emissions, but can be difficult to implement at the national or international 
level because of pushback from industry and from political gridlocks. 
 Cap and trade markets help achieve reductions in global carbon emissions by 
putting a price on carbon and/or other greenhouse gas emissions, which helps stimulate 
abatement and drive investment in low carbon technologies and services.20  Cap and trade 
markets can be either voluntary or compliance markets.  Voluntary markets typically 
involve entities which voluntarily decide to reduce their carbon footprint by using offsets.  
In contrast, compliance markets are mandatory and generally limit emissions by a regional 
or nationwide “cap,” allowing carbon units to be bought and sold on a carbon market.21 
 Compliance carbon markets establish a price of carbon through traditional concepts 
of supply and demand by constraining the amount of carbon “permits” available and thus 
increasing the price of carbon through scarcity. The most common emissions trading 
scheme is a cap and trade program, where a central authority caps the amount of carbon 
emissions an industry or entity can emit and instigates rules and regulations to create a 
market for carbon emission units to be bought and sold.22  The scheme’s cap dictates 
scarcity of the carbon, which in turn helps dictate the price of carbon.23  However, most 
emissions trading schemes also allow entities to meet their obligations under the cap 
                                                          
20 RICHARD GLEDHILL ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, REVIEW OF CARBON MARKETS 3 (2008), 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/carbon_market.pdf. 
21 KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW CARBON FINANCE & NEW CARBON 
FINANCE, STATE OF VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2009, 6 (2009), 
http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms_documents/StateOfTheVoluntaryCarbonMarkets_
2009.pdf. 
22Id. 
23 Id. 
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through the use of “offset” credits created by projects outside of the cap.24 The system 
allocates or auctions tradable allowances to emission sources or fuel distributors, and the 
total number of allowances adds up to the amount of emissions allowed under the cap.25 
Free allocation of allowances is one policy tool to help mitigate the economic impact of the 
cap and trade program. California’s program would use free allocations to help the 
electricity industry transition to a cap and trade program, whereas RGGI chose to use 
primarily an auctioning approach to allowances. The point of regulation varies - an 
“upstream” approach regulates fuel suppliers, while a “downstream” approach regulates the 
entities that emit the greenhouse gas emissions.26  
  The most effective, cost efficient way to implement a cap and trade system is by 
maximizing the efficient factors that make up a cap and trade system, which means: 
“targeting all fossil-fuel-related CO2 emissions through an upstream, economy-wide cap; 
setting a trajectory of caps over time that begins modestly and gradually becomes more 
stringent; establishing a long-run price signal to encourage investment; adopting 
mechanisms to protect against cost uncertainty; and including linkages with the climate-
policy actions of other countries.”27  A regulation becomes “incomplete” by targeting 
anything less than all fossil fuel emissions within an economy, and is ridden with possible 
policy obstacles and failures because it is vulnerable to emissions leakage outside of the 
cap. Incomplete regulation is also less cost effective than a program with broader, more 
expansive coverage, such as inclusion of as many sources as possible.28  Thus, incomplete 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Pew Center, Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program for the U.S., 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-
depth/all_reports/mandatory_ghg_reduction_prgm/usgas_execsumm.cfm. 
26 Id. 
27 Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Cap-and-Trade System, 
24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 298, 299 (2008). 
28 LAWRENCE GOULDER & WILLIAM PIZER, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2006). 
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regulatory systems can undermine emissions reductions produced under the regulation and 
cost more than programs that have broader coverage. Emissions leakage occurs under 
incomplete regulation where unregulated entities capture market power from regulated 
entities due to increases in prices under the incomplete regulation.  
IV. THE PROBLEM OF EMISSIONS LEAKAGE IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
 Emissions leakage can be defined as “the ratio of emissions increase from a specific 
sector outside the [cap] (as a result of a policy affecting that sector in the [cap]) over the 
emission reductions in the sector (again, as a result of the environmental policy).”29 
Specifically in relation to cap and trade programs implemented as sub-national regimes, 
coverage of emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sectors (such as electricity generation) can 
create a disadvantage to those sectors relative to out-of-state competitors.30  For the 
electricity sector, this can lead to a shift in electricity production to generators outside of 
the cap and total emissions of the area could remain unchanged or even increase.31 This is 
important because “[l]eakage from the regulated regions can undermine the cap and trade 
market by distorting actual emissions levels and providing incentives to shift, rather than 
reduce, GHG emissions.”32 Emissions leakage in a cap and trade program occurs where 
three important factors are present: 1. The grid is connected enough to make the electricity 
sector “trade-exposed” such that out-of-state competitors could in fact take on a certain 
amount of generation from inside of the cap; 2. The cap is stringent enough to create a price 
                                                          
29 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ISSUES BEHIND COMPETITIVENESS AND CARBON LEAKAGE 3 
(2008). The Western Climate Initiative defines leakage as “a shift in power plant operations or 
investment from WCI to non-WCI jurisdictions, which reduces WCI CO2 emissions while increasing 
non-WCI CO2 emissions.” WCI, ELECTRICITY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT 9 (2009). 
30 CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: AIR RESOURCES BOARD (“ARB”), STAFF REPORT:  
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAM, Part I, Volume I at II-26 (released Oct. 28, 2010) (approved with modifications Dec. 
16, 2010) (hereinafter “STAFF REPORT”). 
31 Id. 
32 WCI,SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 29, at 5. 
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on carbon that is high enough to affect generation under the cap to the point where 
generation is shifted to sources outside of the cap; and 3. The sources outside of the cap are 
“dirtier” than those sources which, absent the price on carbon, would have provided the 
electricity.  For cap and trade programs implemented as sub-national regimes within the 
United States, all three assumptions are quite probable. As discussed in Section III, the 
Electricity Markets Overview section, the United States has a highly interconnected 
electricity grid, making the electricity sector exposed to out of state competitors should 
prices increase.  
 The interconnectedness of the grid also contributes to the second factor – creation of 
a carbon price high enough to cause a shift in generation. The ease with which generation 
from outside of a sub-national cap and trade market can take on some of the market power 
of generation within the cap and trade market makes the requisite increase in electricity 
price to cause emissions leakage relatively low.  
The third factor, that there are “dirtier” sources nearby, is also easily satisfied in the 
United States. Coal, the dirtiest source of electricity, provides the nation with 45% of its 
electricity - more than any other resource, and more than the second and third place 
resources combined (natural gas and nuclear power, respectively).33  
 Thus, emissions leakage for sub-national cap and trade programs in the United 
States presents a unique disadvantage to policymakers. Policymakers do not have a perfect 
model to follow for creation of measures to battle the problem. Instead, they must proceed 
blindly and choose to either implement intricate, administratively complicated measures or 
follow a wait-and-see approach and hope that the data gained from the program shows only 
minimal leakage.  
A. Leakage Causation 
                                                          
33 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009, 228 (2010). 
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 Emissions leakage can be described through a few simple formulae. Robert Ritz, in 
his paper on carbon leakage under incomplete environmental regulation describes the 
phenomena of leakage, emphasizing the consequences of environmental regulations that 
cover only a subset of firms within a sector.34  He demonstrates the causation of leakage 
through the following equation35:  
Equation 1: Emissions leakage  
 
L= 
   
    
 
 
Where:  
L=Leakage 
EO=change in emissions by entities outside of the cap  
EI=change in emissions by entities from inside the cap 
 
 In other words, leakage is defined by the proportion of emissions reductions by 
“inside” entities (      that leaks out in the form of emission increases by “outside” 
entities.36 This leakage occurs where the “inside” generators’ marginal costs increase due to 
the price on carbon under the cap.37 This in turn leads to a decrease in emissions under the 
cap or a decrease in output, or both, leading towards         38 Yet, “outside” generators 
do not similarly have this marginal cost increase, so they can gain market share, which in 
turn increases their emissions,       39 Thus, L>0 and emissions leakage occurs.40 If 
L 1, then the emissions leakage actually increases the emissions as opposed to emissions 
had the cap and trade system not been implemented. 
                                                          
34 ROBERT RITZ, CARBON LEAKAGE UNDER INCOMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: AN INDUSTRY-
LEVEL APPROACH 3 (2009). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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 Emissions leakage thus occurs under “incomplete” climate change policies – policies 
that apply to a sub-sector of an economy. The causes for emissions leakage are relatively 
straightforward, but the conditions which worsen emissions leakage are not as simple. 
However, the International Energy Agency notes that the short-term competitiveness 
channel (the ability of unconstrained competitors outside of the cap to take the market 
share of entities inside of the cap) and the investment channel (increases in marginal costs 
from mitigation under the cap cause firms to relocate capital outside of the cap) are 
extremely important factors determining the rate and amount of leakage of a climate 
change policy.41  In a way, the competitiveness and investment opportunities define the 
“trade-exposed” industries, or the industries that are carbon intensive and face competition 
with unconstrained competitors without similar compliance requirements. 
Thus, the electricity sector’s vulnerability to emissions leakage is highly dependent 
on both its ability to respond to carbon constraints as well as its unconstrained competitors 
outside of the cap to accommodate excess generation. This can be further expressed in the 
form of three factors determining a sector’s vulnerability to leakage under a sub-national 
program: 1. The outside generators’ emissions intensity relative to inside firms before the 
policy is implemented; 2. Energy efficiency improvements of inside generators after the 
policy is implemented; and 3. The amount of profitable opportunities for inside generators 
to switch to cleaner production technologies.42 Hence, if generators located outside of the 
cap are “dirtier” than inside the cap and cheaper, the margin for energy efficiency 
improvements is small for generators under the cap, and the generators under the cap are 
relatively constrained from switching to cleaner technologies, then leakage will occur at a 
                                                          
41 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CARBON LEAKAGE, supra note 29 ,at 3. 
42 RITZ, supra note 34, at 3-4. 
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higher rate than if the opposite were true. Of course, the rate of leakage remains unknown 
unless regulators are able to monitor it in some way, which proves to be quite difficult. 
B. Inability to Track the Flow of Electricity 
 The inability to track and verify the environmental attributes of electricity from the 
generator to the consumer greatly affects the ability to discern the extent of emissions 
leakage in a sub-national cap and trade system.  Although the inability to track the flow of 
electricity itself is not necessarily a cause of emissions leakage, it certainly accentuates the 
inability of policymakers to even attempt to manage the problem.  
 In order to monitor and quantify emissions leakage (as in RGGI) or to utilize 
policies to prevent emissions leakage (as in California’s proposed cap and trade program), 
the electricity must be tracked back to the generator. However, tracking the physical 
charge of electricity is essentially impossible. As explained by the National Council on 
Competition and the Electric Industry: 
[E]lectricity follows the laws of physics, not the computations of accountants.  
With an interconnected grid, the power flow over the transmission system is 
ambiguous.  A relevant generalization is that power is put into the grid at 
certain points and taken out at other points.  Which generator produced the 
power that went through a particular customer’s meter is, in a physical 
sense, indeterminate, except in a very few cases.43 
 
The electricity created from the charge carried through electrons simply cannot be traced 
back from a customer to the generation source.  Two ways to attempt to track the 
environmental attributes (or the emissions associated with the electricity) are to either 
have a system to track contracts or to tag electricity.44 Tracking contracts focuses on the 
chain of financial transactions between generators and electricity suppliers.45 In a tagging 
                                                          
43 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPETITION AND THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY, FULL ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISCLOSURE – TRACKING AND REPORTING KEY INFORMATION 5 (David Moskovitz ed., 1997). 
44 RICHARD SEDANO, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPETITION AND THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY, 
ELECTRIC PRODUCT DISCLOSURE: A STATUS REPORT 23 (2002). 
45 See id. 
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system, generators create tags for each MWh they produce and then pass those tags along 
the supply chain.46 Utilities are required to hold certificates for all power sold to consumers. 
Both systems can be hugely burdensome administratively.  To some extent, tagging could 
be slightly less burdensome, as it on the face only requires knowledge of the generation and 
end-utility transaction, whereas tracking financial transactions throughout the entire 
system could be information-heavy.47 
 Tracking electricity is made more complicated through spot markets – markets 
where electricity is bought and sold on an hour-ahead or day-ahead market.  In this 
situation, there is no clear path of ownership between a generator and utility, because 
buyers buy power out of a pool without being able to specify the type of electricity they 
buy.48 Similarly, difficulties arise for sub-national cap and trade programs attempting to 
track electricity from outside of the program’s jurisdiction – much of the power is 
“unspecified,” like the spot market pool of power. Issues associated with tracking electricity 
from outside a cap and trade program include: issues of data validity, legal issues 
associated with the inability to impose any tracking burden on entities outside the 
jurisdiction, and issues from the inability to enforce any tracking requirement.49 
 A specific tension between tracking electricity and creating climate change policy is 
that of sub-national cap and trade programs incorporating emissions associated with 
imported electricity into the program. One way to construct a cap and trade system to assist 
with accounting for imported electricity is to use a load-based point of regulation.50 Yet, this 
approach offers many problems with tracking electricity beyond state borders to generators 
                                                          
46 See id. 
47 Id. 
48 NATIONAL WIND, DESIGN GUIDE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATE TRACKING SYSTEMS 10 
(2004). 
49 Id. at 15. 
50 WCI, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 29, at 12. 
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not subject to the cap and trade program. Thus, there must be a system to accounting for 
the imported electricity consumed, which often is done by monitoring contracts and spot 
market transactions. A load-based point of regulation indirectly includes all generators that 
contribute electricity to the cap and is in direct contrast to a source-based point of 
regulation, which only covers emissions created from generators physically located under 
the cap.51 California and the Western Climate Initiative both propose to use a consumption-
based point of regulation by regulating “first jurisdictional deliverers,” or the first entity 
that delivers electricity onto the grid over which the regulators have jurisdiction. In 
contrast, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative uses a source-based point of regulation in 
that it only regulates power plants under its cap. This approach is easier to track, as all 
generation is subject to regulation and can better harmonize a comprehensive tracking 
system.  Tracking electricity is important in a load-based program, as the first entity that 
delivers electricity to the grid needs to be able to account for the emissions of that 
electricity. In a way, attempting to incorporate emissions from imported power into an 
emissions leakage prevention policy (as exemplified in California’s proposed cap and trade 
program) requires some load-based mechanisms in order to track the electricity to the 
source. This is because imported power is tagged with emissions at the point of the “first 
seller” into the relevant market, which is not source-based. First jurisdictional sellers must 
be able to somehow track as much electricity as possible back to the source. 
 Despite the difficulties, there are a few successful tracking systems already in place. 
NE-ISO has a Generation Information System (“GIS”) in place that tracks all generation in 
or delivered to the dispatch and control area.52 Certificates are issued based on settlement 
(rebundling of attributes at the pool transmission facility) data and deposited into 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 NATIONAL WIND, supra note 48, at 7. 
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generator accounts so that certificate transfers can occur. Data is derived from financial 
data from ISO’s Market Settlement System.  PJM also has a Generation Attribute Tracking 
System (“GATS”), which creates and tracks a generator-specific electronic certificate for 
every MWh of electricity produced by a generator.53 Each certificate has a unique serial 
number, and in that way is tracked through every financial transaction.54 The GIS and 
GATS are compatible with each other. Texas and Wisconsin also have programs to track 
Renewable Energy Credits associated with their Renewable Portfolio Standards.55 
C. Law and Regulation 
 The legal and regulatory schemes that this nation has built around federalism and 
electricity regulation can often be both causes and obstacles to the solution to emissions 
leakage in sub-national cap and trade programs. Though the Commerce Clause in the 
Constitution is a positive grant of power to Congress, it also serves as a negative removal of 
power to states by denying states the power to “unjustifiably to discriminate against or 
burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”56 This Constitutional clause provides 
significant problems with creating a sub-national cap and trade program that aims to 
account for emissions from imported power. States must treat the power the same as in-
state power – they must refrain from discriminating against the power. Yet, it is often 
difficult to specify the source of electricity, so assigning emissions to imported power can 
often lead to differential treatment between imported and “domestic” power in a sub-
national cap and trade program. This issue is explored further infra in Section VIII(C)(2) in 
the context of California’s proposed cap and trade program. 
                                                          
53 PJM, Generation Attribute Tracking System, http://www.pjm.com/about-
pjm/newsroom/~/media/about-pjm/newsroom/downloads/gats-fact-sheet.ashx. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 
93, 98 (1994). 
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 Further, sub-national programs must step carefully around the authority of the 
Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) in its regulation of wholesale power. 
Section 206 of the Federal Power Act gives FERC the power to set and review wholesale 
power rates.57  When sub-national cap and trade programs are attempting to regulate 
imported power, these programs must utilize policies that will not regulate the wholesale 
power in such a way to infringe on FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale power.  This 
difficulty is also discussed infra in Section VIII(B) regarding California’s proposed cap and 
trade program. 
 Thus, regional or state cap and trade programs that choose to regulate emissions 
associated with imported power under the cap are left with extremely difficult policy 
obstacles before the program even gets off the ground. The imported emissions carry with 
them constitutional and regulatory land mines that must be carefully considered. This 
leads to a heavily front-loaded administrative approach to treatment of imported power, 
creating high administrative costs at the outset that may or may not pay off once the 
program is implemented. Yet, many policymakers choose to do this approach in fear of the 
effects if emissions leakage is not addressed. 
D. Emissions Leakage Effects 
 Emissions leakage is not just an abstract economic concept – it produces unwanted 
consequences. First and foremost, it sacrifices efficiency in emissions reductions at a high 
cost. One study on emissions leakage found that an “incomplete” cap and trade program, or 
a program that applies to only a subset of facilities contributing to the pollution problem, 
achieves only 35% of the emissions reductions of a complete cap and trade program at more 
                                                          
57 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, e; see, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 281-82 
(1976) (holding that the FPC could consider allegations of the wholesale customers of certain 
municipally owned and cooperative electrical systems that wholesale rates were discriminatory and 
noncompetitive in comparison to retail rates). 
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than twice the implied cost per ton of emissions reduced.58  Thus, the prominent reason why 
emissions leakage is a “problem” is because it can defeat the very purpose for which a sub-
national cap and trade program is put in place by decreasing or even making a positive 
impact on the amount of emissions reductions incurred. Economically, it creates concerns in 
relation to distributional welfare –money is transferred from the capped region or state to 
areas outside of the cap. Emissions leakage, or the threat of emissions leakage, puts a 
heavy administrative burden on any cap and trade program in preventing potential leakage 
and rectifying any ongoing leakage. This in itself is an efficiency loss to the system. The 
most efficient way to mitigate such emissions leakage is to have a broader, more inclusive 
system. In the absence of such a system, sub-national cap and trade systems in the 
international arena and in the United States are beginning to experiment with which could 
help approach the “messy” problem of implementing an “incomplete” environmental 
program at a regional or state level. However, a quick discussion about emissions leakage 
policies worldwide is first examined. 
V. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES OF SUB-NATIONAL CARBON 
MARKET REGIMES 
 
A. The Sub-National Climate Change Policymaker’s Problem 
 One of the largest dilemmas in sub-national climate change policymaking is 
mapping a complex, sub-national climate change policy onto a highly-connected national 
economy.  This causes an extremely messy policy problem in administrative efficiency of 
policy implementation.59  Essentially, a policymaker implementing climate change policy 
must deal with wicked, ill-defined problems that are not necessarily solved through some 
                                                          
58 MEREDITH FOWLIE, INCOMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND 
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE 4 (2009). 
59 STEVEN NEY, RESOLVING MESSY POLICY PROBLEMS 8 (2009). 
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universal decisionmaking process. 60  Like much progressive social policy, climate change 
policymakers at the regional and state level are left to grapple with this problem without 
much “prior art” to learn from, thus becoming the nation’s laboratories in themselves. The 
consequences of such sub-national approaches within a broader economy can be quite costly 
– both in monetary terms and in emissions reductions. 
Thus, a policymaker’s dilemma in creating climate change policy in a sub-national 
regime is the messy, wicked problem of converting a sub-national policy into one that will 
withstand the tests of time.  The policy must inevitably operate within an anthropogenic- 
constructed boundary, while minding the reality of interstate commerce and the physics of 
a highly interconnected national electricity grid.  This creates a tension between 
administrative effectiveness and environmental integrity of the climate change policy. Once 
a region or other subset of a national political entity resolves to put into place a climate 
policy, it is only logical that this would be the result.  Policymakers of sub-national climate 
change regimes are faced with such extremely complex problems associated with 
implementation that they are faced with two options: 1. Implement a climate change 
regime that is administratively complicated to manage but more environmentally sound; or 
2. Create a climate change regime that is simple to implement but sacrifices a certain 
amount of environmental integrity.  
 The tension between efficiency or effectiveness and environmental integrity is 
especially true in relation to policies created to address emissions leakage in the electricity 
sector under a sub-national cap and trade system. The electricity grid in the United States 
                                                          
60 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber described the nature of the policymaker’s dilemma in their 1973 
paper, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas 
in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973). Rittel and Webber’s argument is that 
utilization of science as a basis for solutions in social policy is bound to fail because science is 
developed to deal with “tame” problems and social problems are “wicked” in nature Id. Social 
problems are inherently different than scientific problems – they are “wicked” in their nature 
because they are ill-defined and “rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution.” Id.  at 160. 
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is highly interconnected61, so it is difficult for a sub-national cap and trade market to 
ensure that its cap is not compromised due to emissions leakage. If prices of electricity 
increase under the cap, then it is difficult for a sub-national cap and trade market to stop 
electricity from outside of the cap to be used instead. Policies put into place to mitigate this 
consequence are faced with multiple obstacles, most of which deal with the inability to 
extend jurisdiction over electricity generation in other states.    
Thus, policymakers approaching messy problems are left to wield a certain amount 
of judgment guided by selected ideas, values, and beliefs in order to impose a policy onto an 
area that is only a subsector of the affected population. This inevitably leads to weighted 
decisions where there may not be a “right” solution.  Where policymakers are faced with 
such a delicate balancing act between administrative efficiency and environmental 
integrity, it is perhaps best for policymakers to follow the precautionary principle and 
delineate policies to deal with the failings of the “incomplete” environmental regulations 
from the outset to avoid possibly degrading the policy scheme and environment in the 
future.  
California chose to do so in its Proposed Regulation to Implement a Cap and Trade 
Program by approaching emissions leakage problems before implementing the program. 
Although California in turn has faced not a small amount of obstacles in anticipating 
emissions leakage within a small, statewide carbon market that maps onto a nationwide 
electricity grid, it is using precaution ex ante. Expense of such resources is a type of gamble 
in that it could be that emissions leakage does not create costs equal to those resources 
spent to prevent it. Yet, the prevention in itself could prove extremely valuable once the cap 
and trade program is in place, as it is much more difficult to create such policy once the 
program is operating. In contrast, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative implemented a 
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more passive, wait-and-see approach to emissions leakage, possibly sacrificing integrity of 
its program and of the environment once the cap starts tightening. RGGI’s choice to 
passively monitor emissions leakage was a choice that could still prove to be troublesome 
once the cap begins to ratchet down in 2015. Given the precarious placement of sub-
national programs onto the national electricity grid, it seems more logical to deal with 
emissions leakage policies outright than to wait and monitor the costs that it might cause. 
Precaution seems to be a better guide for policymakers wishing to successfully decrease 
emissions and maintain a robust sub-national carbon market.  
B. International Leakage Approaches: Overview 
 Interestingly, emissions leakage concerns in the electricity sector have not been as 
large of an issue in other international cap and trade markets. The European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme62 has very limited concerns about emissions leakage from the 
electricity sector due to the large coverage of the capped area.63 It does have extensive 
concerns of carbon leakage through other sectors, and in December 2008, the European 
Commission and European Parliament agreed on a revision of the ETS Directive that 
deems certain sectors and/or subsectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage in 
order to receive more free allowances.64 Similarly, New South Wales has a Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme (GGAS)65 that has largely ignored emissions leakage issues, although it 
is a sub-national program. This may have been a mistake - over 33% of the abatement 
                                                          
62 The EU has a substantial Emissions Trading Scheme that covers approximately 11,000 power 
stations and industrial plants in 30 countries.  European Commission Climate Action, Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. 
63 Indeed, it has been estimated that the EU actually has no notable emissions leakage from its 
electricity sector as a result of its broad cap and trade program. Michael Grubb, Climate Strategies, 
Presentation to IETA / RFF Side Event, Carbon Flows and Carbon Leakage, Dec. 7, 2010. 
64 European Commission Climate Action, ETS: Carbon Leakage Background, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/leakage_en.htm. 
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credits issued from 2003-2005 were from projects outside the borders of New South Wales, 
and it is estimated that only about 30% of the certificates issued were for reductions within 
New South Wales for electricity generation in New South Wales from 2003-2005.66  
 Thus, most concerns about emissions leakage under the electricity sector center 
around sub-national regimes in the United States due in part to the vulnerability of these 
regimes to emissions leakage because of both the highly interconnected nature of the 
United States electric grid and also the “incompleteness” of the cap and trade regimes in 
spatial coverage. As mentioned, the two case studies that follow have approached emissions 
leakage in different ways. RGGI implemented a passive, wait-and-see program, while 
California’s program is proposing a highly proactive policy towards emissions leakage. The 
first program to implement a mandatory cap and trade program in the United States was 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 
VI. CASE STUDY #1: THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
A. Overview 
 In 2003, the Governor of New York began discussions with eleven states in the area 
to gauge cooperation for a regional cap and trade regime.67 By the summer of 2003, a 
working group had created an action plan for a regional cap and trade program.68 On 
December 20, 2005, seven states entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to 
implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”).69  RGGI is the first 
                                                          
66 CENTRE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS, THE NSW GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION 
SCHEME: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NGAC REGISTRY FOR THE 2003, 2004 AND 2005 COMPLIANCE PERIODS 4 
(2007). 
67 MORGAN HANSEN, EMISSIONS TRADING: EU ETS, US VOLUNTARY MARKET & CARBON CREDIT 
PROJECTS AS OFFSETS 21 (2008). 
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mandatory, market-based effort in the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.70 
It is a regional cap and trade program covering ten states in the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic and targets reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.71 Its goal is 
for each state to achieve a 10% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by electric power 
plants from their base level emissions by 2018.72 The program officially started on January 
1, 2009, stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions from 2009-2014 and decreasing the cap by 
2.5% per year from 2015-2018, for a total of 10% reduction by 2018.73 All of the RGGI 
states, except for Vermont, are deregulated in the generation and sale of electricity, and the 
RGGI region also falls under the jurisdiction of four ISOs/RTOs which manage the 
transmission and wholesale electricity markets of the area while also ensuring reliability of 
the grid.74 The coverage of the program is “source-based” in that it only covers fossil-fuel 
fired power plants under the cap that are 25 megawatts or greater in size.75 
RGGI was concerned with the probability of emissions leakage because it was 
implemented as a subset within an extremely interconnected and competitive generation 
market. 76 A price on carbon could thus easily lead to a shift in generation from sources 
                                                          
70 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), Welcome, http://www.rggi.org/home. 
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72 Id.  
73 RGGI, The RGGI CO2 Cap, http://www.rggi.org/design/overview/cap. 
74 CENTER FOR INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, ECONOMIC AND ENERGY IMPACTS FROM 
MARYLAND’S POTENTIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 20 (2007) (the 
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75 RGGI, Fact Sheet: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf. The WCI notes that this generator-based approach 
generally “failed to address the leakage potential at all.” WCI, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS: 
BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAM 23 (2008). 
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under the RGGI program to higher-emitting sources outside of the cap.77 Specifically, 
Pennsylvania acted as a threat for emissions leakage because it was connected to the grid 
associated with the states under the RGGI system, it had excess capacity that could be 
absorbed – capacity that in 2002 exceeded the annual CO2 emissions cap for the seven 
RGGI states –and it did not sign onto RGGI.78  
 However, at the outset it should be noted that the RGGI program has been criticized 
that its own weak cap and the nation’s economic conditions make it so that the program has 
done little to change power plant behavior.79 Both the nation’s economic recession and 
dropping natural gas prices caused the region’s carbon dioxide emissions to drop nine 
percent between 2008 and 2009, placing carbon dioxide emissions in the RGGI region at 
thirty-four percent below the cap level in 2009.80 Utilities in the region candidly admit that 
the cap has done nothing to change their day-day business decisions.81 Although the cap set 
is indeed weak, the states involved under RGGI were still concerned about the possibility of 
emissions leakage. 
 Starting in 2005, the RGGI Agency Heads recognized the possibility of emissions 
leakage and directed staff to study, analyze, and propose policy solutions on emissions 
leakage.82 An Initial Report was delivered in 2007, and the Final Report was completed in 
2008, making the emission leakage policymaking process last at least four years.83 It is still 
unclear how much the emissions leakage problem would have affected the cap and trade 
system if measures were not taken to preempt any problems associated with it – one report 
                                                          
77 Id. 
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noted that the “order of magnitude of the potential problem is relatively small.”84 The RGGI 
report on emission leakage itself acknowledged that “[t]here is significant uncertainty 
related to the magnitude of the potential threat of emissions leakage and the manner in 
which emissions leakage may occur.”85 Furthermore, the impact of emissions leakage 
depends on the value of CO2 allowances, and critics point out that a significant shortfall of 
RGGI is its weak pricing for emissions allowances.86 The price of allowances is critical for a 
cap and trade market, as it acts as the “price signal” for the price of carbon. This is 
important from an environmental standpoint because it is that price signal that, assuming 
it is passed onto consumers, will change consumer behavior (and, in the long term, industry 
behavior).87  
RGGI suffers from an over-supply of allowances with not enough demand, such that 
its allowance price remains extremely low – indeed, at RGGI’s ninth auction in September, 
2010, not all of the available allowances for sale were sold at the auction.88 Just fewer than 
25% were left as excess, and the price of the 75% that were bought was $1.86 – the 
“basement” reserve price for the auction.89 A low price on allowances means that electricity 
under the cap will not carry a large, marked price difference as compared to electricity sold 
outside of the cap. RGGI performed an analysis of the system in 2009 and reported that 
“[n]et imports of electricity into the RGGI region were estimated to be virtually the same in 
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2009 as in 2005.”90 Of course, the system is still in its stabilization period and, given that 
the allowance prices and electricity demand are low, emissions leakage does not yet seem to 
pose any problem to the RGGI cap and trade system. 
 On the other hand, several economic studies determined that leakage occurring 
under RGGI could be significant. Perhaps most notably, Marek Kolodzieg and Ian Sue Wing 
performed a numerical analysis on theoretical emissions leakage under RGGI and found 
the possibility for an astonishing rate of emissions leakage of approximately thirty-three 
percent by the year 2015.91 Although they emphasized the relatively small economic impact 
of RGGI, they pointed out that the small impact created large increases in power exports 
from unconstrained states.92  Yihsu Chen determined leakage under RGGI could be much 
higher – his economic model was run before RGGI was put into place and estimated leakage 
between eighty to ninety percent for the year 2006.93 These numbers are skewed by the fact 
that Chen’s model used allowance prices of pollutants other than CO2 - mainly prices from 
the Clean Air Act’s acid rain trading program - which were selling allowances at a price of 
between $769-$1,840 for Chen’s model, while RGGI’s actual CO2 allowance prices have 
turned out to be somewhere around $1.89.94 Even so, RGGI itself estimated that a “middle-
of-the-road” scenario would produce emissions leakage of about twenty-seven percent of the 
net carbon dioxide emissions reductions through 2015.95 
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 Regardless, RGGI formed a working group to suggest certain policies for alleviating 
any possible emissions leakage issues ex ante. Yet, these policy recommendations were 
passive approaches that would enhance the ability of RGGI to determine the extent of 
emissions leakage after the cap and trade system was already in place. The working group 
hung its hopes on the implementation of a national cap and trade program that would moot 
any emissions leakage concerns under RGGI. Indeed, the working group stated in its final 
report on emissions leakage, “[g]iven current political momentum toward a national 
program, Staff views the potential for emissions leakage primarily as a near- to mid-term 
concern.”96 The report later states, “[m]any business executives expect a national carbon 
policy to be implemented between 2012 and 2015.”97 As the nation’s first binding cap and 
trade system put into place, RGGI policymakers had to balance the aspirations of their own 
cap and trade system with the current tide of political thought. Further, it was easier for 
the policymakers to implement a more passive approach to emissions leakage than to act as 
the nation’s laboratory and make policy on a subject that was not yet well-researched or 
studied. It was not even clear whether the system would even be affected by high emissions 
leakage, so the policymakers put less emphasis on precaution and more emphasis on 
information gathering under the system so that any emissions leakage could be detected 
once the regime was put into place.  
 RGGI policymakers also knew that the cap of the system was extremely mild – the 
system was only “stabilizing” carbon emissions through 2014. Given the uncertainty of the 
actual impact of leakage on the RGGI region, the weak cap in the beginning years, and the 
confidence in the passage of a national system in the near future, the policymakers logically 
weighed administrative efficiency heavily over concerns of environmental integrity lost 
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from not implementing leakage prevention measures ex ante. Indeed, the Final Report on 
emissions leakage suggested that RGGI participating states “prioritize the implementation 
of emissions leakage mitigation measures that have demonstrated effectiveness and that 
can be implemented relatively quickly, instead of more complex measures that would 
require greater implementation lead times and for which effectiveness has yet to be 
demonstrated.”98 This is in stark contrast from California’s own cap and trade regime, 
where policymakers are creating quite complicated leakage measures ex ante, at a high cost 
of administrative time and efficiency. It is possible that the current national standstill on 
carbon policy contributes to California’s concern, whereas the political pulse on carbon 
policy during the creation of RGGI seemed to be more hopeful. It is also possible that the 
inclusion of multiple states under RGGI made it more difficult in general to get emissions 
leakage policies in place than in California’s case, which deals with only one state. 
 Among the policy choices recommended by RGGI’s working group were: 1. 
Modification of tracking systems in the three ISO regions included under the cap to monitor 
potential emissions leakage99; 2. Policies that indirectly address carbon emissions by 
reducing electricity demand100; 3. Carbon adder and emissions rate mechanisms101; and 4. 
Capping emissions associated with serving load102.  The only recommendations truly 
adopted into practice under RGGI were the modification of tracking systems. 
B. Modification of Tracking Systems 
 As noted supra, the ability to track the environmental attributes of electricity is 
paramount to monitoring and measuring the extent of emissions leakage. RGGI proposed to 
attack this issue by utilizing current tracking systems of the covered ISOs and updating 
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them further to accommodate the cap and trade regime.  Of the four ISO/RTO systems 
involved under RGGI, two (PJM’s GAT and ISO-NE’s GIS) already had systems in place to 
account for MWHs of electricity generated and MWHs of electricity used as well as the 
environmental attributes of those MWHs.103 NY-ISO is currently in the process of 
modifying its current system to incorporate the ability to track the environmental 
attributes and MWHs of the electricity used throughout its system through possibly 
adopting ISO-NE’s GIS system.104  
 Between these three systems, virtually all of the electricity under the RGGI system 
could be tracked.105 These systems are further described supra in section V(B). RGGI 
proposed adding new categories of generation units to the tracking systems already in 
place, labeling generation as generation from one of three categories: 1. RGGI-affected unit 
(> 25 MW fossil fuel-fired unit subject to RGGI cap and trade program); 2. Unaffected fossil 
fuel-fired RGGI-region unit (e.g. <25 MW not subject to RGGI but under jurisdiction of 
RGGI area); and 3. RGGI-region unit (includes RGGI-affected units and all other units 
located in the RGGI region, e.g., a unit located within a control area fully subject to RGGI 
or located within the RGGI portion of a control area partially subject to RGGI).106  The net 
power flows under the ISO/RTO areas would then be tracked either directly (for NY-ISO 
and ISO-NE) or indirectly (for PJM).107  
C. Policies that Reduce Electricity Demand 
 The RGGI Working Group suggested several policies to indirectly approach 
emissions leakage by reducing electricity demand. The policies were generally energy 
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efficiency recommendations, and included energy efficiency portfolio standards, building 
energy codes, appliance efficiency standards, and combined heat and power systems.108 
D. Carbon Adder and Emissions Rate Mechanisms  
 The carbon adder is a direct approach to emissions leakage and would require the 
load-serving entities to include consideration of carbon emissions in their energy resource 
planning and procurement strategies through a carbon procurement adder and an emission 
portfolio standard.109 The adder would require LSEs to incorporate a “shadow price” for 
carbon emissions into its evaluation of investment options. Incorporation of this “shadow 
price” might alter the “least-cost” option of the LSE.110 An emissions rate mechanism would 
limit the emissions rate of power supplied to an LSE through a long-term power purchase 
agreement, requiring all long-term contracts to meet a specific CO2/MWh emission rate.111 
An emissions portfolio standard would require the LSE to meet an output-based  
emissions standard for the portfolio of electricity supply resources the LSE uses to provide 
retail electricity.112 
E. Capping Emissions 
 A load-based emissions cap would cap CO2 emissions related to all electricity use in 
the region, moving the cap requirement from generators to electricity providers.113 This 
approach eliminates most concerns of emissions leakage - the generation leakage concerns 
are mooted because the LSEs would be subject to regulation and they would need to 
account for their electricity’s environmental attributes, no matter if it came from under the 
cap or outside of it. 
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F. RGGI: Conclusion and Going Forward 
 The Memorandum of Understanding that was signed by RGGI states in 2005 
required a comprehensive 2012 review of all components of the cap-and-trade program, 
including the effectiveness of any measures put in place to control emissions leakage.114 
Clearly, the reliance of RGGI’s Final Report on emissions leakage on a nationwide cap-and-
trade program was misplaced, so it is now important for RGGI states to review the impacts 
of emissions leakage on the integrity of their cap and determine whether more proactive 
measures are necessary. Further, the recommendation of the Working Group on emissions 
leakage that states “prioritize the implementation of emissions leakage mitigation 
measures that can be implemented relatively quickly” does not seem to have caused any 
action, at least on the part of regulated entities.115 Regardless of what RGGI’s 2012 
comprehensive review finds on the actual impacts of emissions leakage to date, the RGGI 
policymakers will find it much more difficult to impose policies on emissions leakage now 
that the system has been in operation for a number of years.  It is possible that the choice of 
the RGGI policymakers to take a more passive approach to emission leakage from the 
outset, coupled with high hopes of a nationwide cap-and-trade program, sealed the fate of 
the RGGI program in relation to emissions leakage should it begin to battle higher prices 
on carbon as the cap ratchets down. As the Western Climate Initiative put it, RGGI has 
“generally failed to address the leakage potential at all.”116 
 RGGI’s program operates as a prime example of a sub-national cap and trade 
program that chose to prioritize administrative efficiency over implementation of proactive 
environmental integrity provisions. Perhaps this is in part due to the political tide of the 
                                                          
114 RGGI MOU, supra note 69, at §6(D). 
115 Edison Electric Institute, Edison Electric Institute Comments on the  Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative’s   
Comprehensive 2012 Review of All Program Components 8 (Nov. 30, 2010).  
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time in which it was implemented, but it seems equally possible that this is due to the lack 
of experience in sub-national regimes. RGGI policymakers were forced to create a system 
that dealt with many diverse and complicated concerns, many of which were not even 
proven to be implicated once the program was put in place.  Faced with the unique 
opportunity to pioneer sub-national cap and trade markets in the nation with its program, 
RGGI’s policymakers made a choice to hedge their bets, create a weak cap, hope that a 
nationwide system would be put in place before long, and let concerns about emissions 
leakage go by the wayside. The consequences of such actions will come to light in 2012, but 
it is clear that the cap will not achieve high emissions reductions even as it ratchets slowly 
down starting in 2015. Thus, although it seems that RGGI’s program is dealing with 
minimal emissions leakage, the passive approach cannot be said to be a reason behind this 
success. If RGGI eventually sees higher carbon prices, it will certainly face at least a small 
amount of leakage that it will not be prepared to handle. It is a strong argument for getting 
measures in place from the outset in order to prevent an overhaul of the program should 
leakage become a problem. 
VII. ARB Proposed Regulation to Implement A California Cap and Trade Program 
 
A. Overview  
 California’s Air Resources Board (ARB) in its Proposed Regulation to Implement the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program is attempting to create the first statewide cap and trade 
regime in the United States.117  The ARB is going to great lengths to create a regime ex-
ante that keeps emissions leakage to a minimum. The regulation is a result of California’s 
Global Warming Solutions Act (“AB 32”), passed in 2006, that set a statewide greenhouse 
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gas emissions goal of 1990 levels by 2020 into law.118 The Act required ARB to develop a 
scoping plan before January 1, 2009 for achieving the maximum technologically feasible 
and cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from sources or categories of 
sources of greenhouse gases by 2020.119 ARB approved its Scoping Plan on December 12, 
2008, and included a recommendation that a cap and trade mechanism be developed as part 
of California’s greenhouse gas reduction efforts.120 Two years, forty public workshops, and 
hundreds of stakeholder meetings later, ARB endorsed the proposed cap and trade program 
with modifications on December 16, 2010.121 Final approval has not yet been reached122, but 
the program is currently set to start on January 1, 2012123. ARB’s Proposed Regulation 
casts a wide net in coverage, as it extends to most large industrial entities and electricity 
generating facilities or importers.124 It also covers more greenhouse gases than just carbon 
dioxide.125 The cap and trade system would start in 2012 with coverage of large industry, 
electricity generation, and importers of electricity126 and expand in 2015 to cover emissions 
from combustion of fuels by residential, commercial, and small industrial, liquefied 
petroleum gas combustion, and transportation fuels127.  
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 California’s effort to enact its own cap and trade program is an even stronger 
example than RGGI of a market created to regulate a “good” within borders that are drawn 
inside of a much larger grid. The inherent nature of the nation’s interconnected electricity 
grid means that the cap within California’s borders imperfectly maps onto the electricity 
grid128 because the electricity grid does not follow the carbon market boundaries.129 
Furthermore, imported electricity accounts for a large part of emissions in California. In 
fact, in 2008, California imported 31 percent of its electricity supply, which accounted for 56 
percent of its electricity sector emissions.130  This makes the probability of emissions 
leakage even higher for California’s carbon market. Yet, in the absence of a national 
market, California must approach such imperfect border matches in order to enact its own 
“interim” or “messy” solution to greenhouse gas emissions. Given constraints in California’s 
ability to regulate entities outside of its borders due to Commerce Clause and federalism 
concerns, the imperfectness of the borders of its carbon market requires policymakers to 
formulate a market that is either simple to administrate or complicated and possibly still 
imperfect in its ability to include concerns of emissions leakage.  
 California effectively chose a precautionary approach to emissions leakage by way of 
its time-intensive efforts upfront to establish policy measures for emissions leakage ex ante. 
Although at least some of the time and resources lost from these efforts could have been 
avoided by a more comprehensive carbon market, if California wishes to make its market as 
structurally and environmentally sound as possible, then these efforts are necessary. In the 
face of the complex, messy problem of overlaying its small carbon market on top of a 
national electricity grid, California policymakers decided to proceed cautiously in order to 
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get it right before the program is in operation. This is probably a wise decision, as once the 
program is in place, overhaul of the program in order to implement such measures would be 
much more time consuming and burdensome. The time and efficiency lost in the 
implementation of preemptive measures must be balanced against the probability of 
compromised environmental and structural integrity of the program from emissions 
leakage.   
The proposed cap-and-trade regime attacks emissions leakage through essentially a 
four-pronged approach: 1. Free allocations of allowances in the early years of the program 
to electrical distribution utilities using emissions efficiency benchmarks131; 2. Utilization of 
a first jurisdictional deliverer approach as the point of regulation132; 3. Accounting for both 
in-state and out-of-state electricity generation; and 4. Linkage to partner jurisdictions in 
the future Western Climate Initiative133.  
B. Free Allocations of Allowances in the Early Years of the Program to the 
Electricity Sector 
 
 Free allocations of allowances to the electricity sector directly mitigate cost impacts 
on ratepayers and indirectly assist with emissions leakage by making the transition by an 
industry to a cap and trade program easier. This is not a measure to actually prevent price 
increases, but instead to help generators capture more producer profit in the cap and trade 
market than others under the market. The allowances given do not affect the total 
emissions allowed under the cap – rather, they just affect the distribution of costs within 
the market. Whereas RGGI did primarily an auctioning approach to allowances in the 
electricity sector134, California’s Proposed Regulation contains a placeholder for allocation of 
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allowances to electrical distribution utilities135, but does not include specifications for 
distribution of allowances among utilities. The Proposed Regulation does allocate 89 million 
allowances multiplied by an adjustment factor each year to electrical distribution 
utilities.136 Essentially, the adjustment factor begins as “1.0” and gradually decreases until 
it reaches “.851” in 2020 in order to gradually decrease the amount of allowances that are 
granted to utilities through 2020.137 The allowances given to IOUs must be auctioned at 
general quarterly auctions, and the proceeds must be used to mitigate the impacts of the 
cap and trade system on distribution customers.138 The stated reason for this maneuver is 
to maintain the “current competitiveness of the deregulated California electricity 
market.”139  
Although the free allocation of allowances to utilities may ease the transition to a 
cap and trade regime, it is not a solution for emissions leakage but merely a way to ease 
into the transition. The cap and the amount allocated are ratcheted down through the 
years, and the free allowances might not fully account for price increases during that time. 
Thus, it is possible that prices in the electricity sector would still be such that emissions are 
leaked outside of the cap. Further, AB 32 required ARB to limit statewide emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020, including all emissions delivered to and consumed in California.140 
Ultimately, ARB had to address imported electricity in order to more fully manage any 
possibility of emissions leakage. Incorporation of imported electricity consumed under the 
cap helps mitigate incentives for emissions leakage by indirectly applying the regulations to 
out of state generators. This helps to encompass generation from outside of the cap, and 
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helps eliminate any advantage such out of state generators would have over generators 
under the cap. 
C. Accounting for both in-state and out-of-state generation 
  
 AB 32 requires ARB to include out-of-state electricity that is consumed in California 
within its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. 141 Although ARB is attacking the 
directive through many other measures, ARB chose a cap and trade system as its primary 
approach to achieve those emissions reductions.142 In-state electricity generation only 
accounts for about 11 percent of CO2 emissions in California, while the emissions from 
electricity in California more than doubles when out-of-state electricity generation to serve 
California consumers is included.143 As aforementioned, California imports more electricity 
than any other state.144 Thus, even aside from AB 32’s directive to account for all emissions 
consumed whether originating in-state or out-of-state, if California wishes to achieve a high 
level of environmental integrity with its cap and trade system, it is imperative for 
California to include electricity from out-of-state generation that is consumed within the 
state’s borders. This approach must be able to measure the emissions from the associated 
generation. This essential component of California’s cap and trade is a creature of sub-
regional cap and trade markets that rears its nasty head during policymaking discussions 
due to the difficulty of tracking electricity on a grid. It is physically impossible to track 
electrons on the grid, so ARB must come up with an approach that is able to either track 
the electricity through electricity tagging or contract methods or to instead just assign a 
default emissions factor to unspecified electricity.  
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ARB proposes to solve this problem by dividing its imported power into two 
categories: specified source of electricity or unspecified source of electricity.  The unspecified 
electricity is then given a “default emissions factor” based on the spot market price in 
California. This creates perverse economic incentives for dirty power to somehow be 
“unspecified” and for clean power to be “specified,” which ultimately could compromise the 
environmental integrity of the system.  ARB’s efforts to include imported electricity under 
the cap and trade program for the sake of environmental integrity of the cap thus could in 
actuality undermine it more than if the imported electricity was treated differently or left 
outside of the cap and trade program.   
 Specified electricity is that which can be traced somehow, either through ownership 
or contracts. That electricity can subsequently be assigned its emissions based on 
knowledge of the generation source. Thus, ARB defines a “specified source of electricity” as 
“a facility or unit which is permitted to be claimed as the source of imported electricity 
delivered by an electricity importer. The electricity importer must have either full or partial 
ownership in the facility/unit or a written contract to procure electricity generated by that 
facility/unit.”145 An “unspecified source of electricity” is defined as “electricity generation 
that cannot be matched to a specific electricity generating facility or electricity generating 
unit or matched to an asset-controlling supplier recognized by ARB.  Unspecified sources 
contribute to the bulk system power pool and typically are dispatchable, marginal resources 
that do not serve baseload.”146 ARB proposes to “assign a default emissions factor to 
unspecified sources of electricity that would be based on the average emissions associated 
with the available electricity generation that could be sold on the spot market and brought 
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into California. The GHG emissions will be calculated by multiplying this emissions factor 
by the MWh delivered.”147 
1. FERC Jurisdictional Issues 
 ARB must be extremely careful in setting its default emissions factor for unspecified 
sources of imported electricity in order to avoid collision with FERC jurisdiction. FERC has 
jurisdiction over wholesale sales of power, and this jurisdiction has been interpreted 
broadly due to the interconnectedness of the electricity grid.148 Further, Section 206 of the 
Federal Power Act gives FERC the power to review wholesale power rates and conditions 
and determine whether these rates are “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.”149  This power is currently exercised in California’s spot market, where FERC 
approves the prices put forth by California’s Independent System Operator.150 FERC has 
sweeping “jurisdiction over all rates, terms, and conditions of electric transmission service 
provided by public utilities in interstate commerce, as well as over the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale.”151   
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ARB’s approach to imported wholesale electricity might involve or infringe on 
FERC’s authority over wholesale electricity rates. ARB’s imposition of a default emissions 
factor onto imported electricity at the wholesale level in California is effectively imposing a 
value onto that imported electricity. This is because the default emissions factor can be 
seen as carrying a value with it – the price on carbon – which is subsequently imposed onto 
imported electricity through the default emissions factor (or other set emissions factors as 
well).  FERC’s jurisdiction over power at the wholesale level stretches across all rates, 
terms, and conditions of transmission service in interstate commerce, such that ARB’s 
imposition of a de facto value onto imported power through emissions factors could very 
well infringe on FERC’s authority.  In a similar way, California’s feed-in tariff program that 
would require utilities to purchase at a price set by the California Public Utilities 
Commission (“CPUC”) electricity from combined heat and power generators and other types 
of renewable generators has experienced difficulties in doing so without infringing on 
FERC’s wholesale power rate-setting authority.  A feed-in tariff usually allows generators 
to receive a premium price for renewable electricity produced, but this forced price impinges 
on FERC’s rate-setting authority at the wholesale level. Indeed, in two separate orders, 
FERC clearly stated that the Federal Power Act preempts the CPUC from establishing 
rates for the utilities’ purchase of electricity unless such rates do not exceed the utility’s 
avoided cost.152 Thus, FERC’s broad authority over wholesale power is easily infringed by 
imposing any kind of value requirement onto the power at that level. Thus, ARB’s usage of 
emissions factors for imported wholesale power could easily run into jurisdictional issues 
unless ARB is able to somehow prove that the value of the emissions factors are legitimate 
values on the wholesale market. 
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Perhaps one way for ARB to do so is to use a default emissions factor that is derived 
from the spot market, which operates under approval by FERC. ARB may be able to argue 
that deriving a default emissions factor from a market which has a value approved by 
FERC is thus also an approved value for imported electricity. However, the default 
emissions factor is still imposed onto imported electricity that may or may not be sold 
through California’s spot market.153 FERC will likely at least flag the approach as adding 
value to imported electricity. ARB’s ability to defend its imposition of the default emissions 
factor on wholesale sales of electricity will depend on the correlation between spot market 
prices and the emissions factor that is defaulted onto the imported power. 
2. Economic Incentives of the Default Emissions Factor Based on the 
Spot Market Price 
  
 The emissions from in-state generation are already measured and reported under 
ARB’s Regulation for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions.154 Approximately 
56 percent of imported electricity is given an emissions intensity from precise identification 
of generation due to the California Climate Action Registry’s Power/Utility Reporting 
Protocol.155 This leaves approximately 44 percent of imported electricity as “unspecified.”156 
Of that unspecified electricity, approximately 50% originates from the Southwest and 
approximately 50% originates from the Northwest.157 The total resource mix of electricity 
imported from the Southwest into California is estimated to be 57.4% coal, 27.9% natural 
gas, 11.4% nuclear, and 3.4% hydropower.158 The total resource mix of electricity imported 
                                                          
153 Imported electricity is also sold through long or short-term contracts (especially for base load 
resources such as coal).  
154 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §38530 (West 2011). 
155 ARB: MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 143, at H-53. 
156 AL ALVARADO & KAREN GRIFFIN, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, REVISED METHODOLOGY TO 
ESTIMATE THE GENERATION RESOURCE MIX OF CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY IMPORTS 6 (2007). 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 14. 
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from the Northwest is estimated to be 65.3% hydropower, 19.4% natural gas, 10.5% coal, 
2.4% renewables, and 2.3% nuclear.159   
 The spot market sells primarily intermediate to peak load power that is much 
cleaner than coal power – in 2009, the resources sold on the spot market were primarily 
marginal, and natural gas accounted for 39% of generation, hydropower accounted for 
9%.160  Natural gas emits approximately one-half the carbon dioxide per unit of energy that 
coal combustion does161, and hydropower operates without emitting carbon dioxide162. This 
means that out-of-state coal generators will have the incentive to sell its power as 
“unspecified” such that it will get a lower emissions factor than if it was specified. In 
contrast, renewable energy generation will have the incentive to put efforts into selling its 
power as “specified” such that its power is not rated as natural gas, which emits more 
carbon dioxide than renewable energy does. This can be shown by a few simple equations. 
 
Equation 2: The profit function for an electricity marketer in California’s cap and trade 
market 
 PSQS + PUQU – C(QS)-C(QU)-PpQp 
s.t. βSQS + βUQU ≤ cap 
The Lagrangian can be written as: 
PSQS + PUQU – C(QS)-C(QU)-PpQp-λ(βSQS + βUQU-Qp) 
With first-order conditions: 
QS: 
  
   
: PS-MCS- λβS=0 
PS=MCS+ λβS 
QU: 
  
   
: PU-MCU- λβU=0 
                                                          
159 Id. at 29. 
160 CALIFORNIA ISO, ANNUAL REPORT ON MARKET ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE 2.10 (2010). See Figure 5 
in Appendix. 
161 B.D. HONG & E.R. SLATICK, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS 
FACTORS FOR COAL (1994). 
162 Bureau of Reclamation, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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PU=MCU+λβU 
QP: 
  
   
: -PP+ λ=0 
λ= PP 
 
Where: 
PS=Price of specified electricity 
PU=Price of unspecified electricity 
PP=Price of permits 
QS=Quantity of specified electricity 
QU =Quantity of unspecified electricity 
Qp=Quantity of permits purchased 
C(QS)=Cost function of specified electricity 
C(QU)=Cost function of unspecified electricity 
βS=emissions intensity of specified electricity 
βU=emissions intensity of unspecified electricity, which will = βmkt or the average of 
emissions on the spot market 
λ stands for the shadow price of greenhouse gas emissions, determined by the cap and trade 
market. 
 
Assuming PP 0, then λβU>0, and λβU acts as a tax on the unspecified power. This tax is 
higher on unspecified power if βU>βS. Similarly, the tax is lower on specified power if βU>βS. 
Thus, if coal’s emissions intensity is actually larger than the default emissions intensity 
assigned to unspecified electricity, βCoal≠βmkt  and βCoal > βmkt, then coal has an incentive to 
ensure its power remains unspecified. This is because the cost of selling its electricity as 
unspecified power, PU, will be less than selling its electricity as specified electricity where 
βCoal > βmkt. However, renewable energy will have an incentive to ensure its power is 
specified if βRenewable≠βmkt  and βRenewable < βmkt. This is because the cost of selling renewable 
electricity as unspecified power, PU, will be higher than selling the electricity as specified 
where βRenewable < βmkt. Coal will capture a lesser emissions intensity, while renewable power 
will move from the unspecified category to specified, causing the default emission intensity 
assigned to unspecified electricity to be overall incorrect. Renewable energy will not have 
an incentive to be unspecified, so the default emissions factor will be applied primarily to 
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dirtier generation than it actually measures, given that the spot market average used for 
the default emissions factor includes renewable energy and natural gas.  
 Hence, the policy decision to utilize a default emissions factor, derived from the 
average emissions on the spot market, creates an incentive to degrade the cap. The 
incentives that the default emissions factor creates are especially impactful given that 
California imports more electricity than any other state in the nation.163 Further, given that 
the majority of electricity imported from the Southwest is coal and the majority of 
electricity imported from the Northwest is hydropower, the incentive for coal to label its 
power as “unspecified” and the incentive for hydropower to label its power as “specified” is 
heightened. While ARB grapples with its limited jurisdiction over the out-of-state electricity 
and attempts to sidestep conflict over FERC jurisdiction, it also must create a system that 
can cope with the inherent shortcomings of the electricity grid. Although ideally each 
electricity sale and purchase would be tracked to individual generators, this is simply not 
the case. Further, the grid expands past California’s borders, so ARB must impose a policy 
on a subset of emissions within a much larger system without any ability to “mark” or track 
the electricity back to its source.  
 Ultimately, the policy it put forth is one of comparative administrative efficiency in 
that the average emissions factor is relatively easy to determine and use for unspecified 
electricity. Other options would entail information and transaction costs of the system, and 
possibly more constitutional challenges. The ARB is left to determine whether it should 
choose an administratively efficient option for unspecified imported electricity that will 
likely sacrifice the environmental integrity of the cap or force a more difficult option on the 
system that could bring better accuracy in accounting for the unspecified electricity 
emissions. This is perhaps the most poignant example of the rough-edged solution that 
                                                          
163 See California Quick Facts, supra note 144.  
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results from the mismatched overlay of policy and the electricity grid under a national 
regime that is at a gridlock in climate change policy. 
3. Other Options to Deal with Emissions from Unspecified Sources of 
Imported Electricity 
 
 ARB could instead choose from a few other options to deal with the emissions from 
unspecified imported electricity. These options include: 1. A high default emissions factor 
that is not tied to the spot market; 2. Regional emission factors that are tied to regional 
sources of electricity; or 3. A regional emissions factor that is tied to the highest polluting 
sources in the area.  
 First, ARB could choose to a set emissions default factor for all power imported 
instead of basing it on spot market prices.164 This number would still have to be high 
enough in order to avoid incentivizing dirty energy to be classified as “unspecified.”  The 
California Energy Commission and California Public Utilities Commission supported this 
approach, and suggested a set regional default emission rate of 1,100 lbs CO2e/MWh, which 
would be eventually replaced by a value developed by the Western Climate Initiative.165  
 Alternatively, ARB could choose a default emissions factor that was related to 
regional variations based on the resource mix or some other defined region, as reported on 
the North American Electricity Reliability Council E-tag.166 This approach seems ideal in 
that it would likely be more accurate in its ability to estimate the actual emissions from the 
generator. However, it is unclear how detailed the regional factor could be, given that the 
                                                          
164 See ARB, Presentation: Including Imported Electricity in a California Cap-and-Trade Program 22, 
June 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/060509pm/presentation.pdf; ARB, Market Advisory 
Committee, supra note 143, at H-54. E-tagging is an electronic label given to electricity that contains 
information about how the electricity is purchased and transmitted, its points of origin, and 
destination on the grid. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, FERC USE OF THE GRID 
RELIABILITY APPROPRIATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, 12 (2004).  
165 ARB, Presentation: Including Imported Electricity, supra note 164, at 20. 
166 Id. at 22. 
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emissions are “unspecified.” If the electricity could at least be determined as originating 
from the Southwest or Northwest, then the emissions factor might be more accurate than a 
factor based on the spot market. This is especially true given the wide variation in 
generation sources between the Southwest and Northwest, and given that the large 
majority of the Northwest generation is primarily hydropower with no emissions, while the 
Southwest is largely coal, which is the dirtiest source of electricity.167 
 Lastly, and possibly most importantly, ARB could utilize an approach which 
assigned a default emissions factor based on the emissions of the most polluting sources 
within a region.168 This is essentially assigning a high default emissions intensity that 
would incentivize specification of electricity imported into California for all sources that are 
cleaner than the dirtiest source in the region. It would act in the opposite manner of the 
chosen policy approach for unspecified electricity. Yet, this approach may invoke 
constitutional concerns because it would burden the unspecified out-of-state electricity that 
was not coal with the emissions factor of coal. Courts would likely see this as a direct 
discrimination against interstate commerce. Running through the Dormant Commerce 
Clause case law discussed infra, the approach would possibly serve a legitimate local 
purpose of climate change and the integrity of the cap, but it could be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as those discussed previously.  
D. The First Jurisdictional Deliverer Approach 
 Covered entities in the electricity sector for ARB’s proposed cap and trade regime 
are “first deliverers of electricity,” which chooses the point of regulation to be the first party 
responsible for putting electricity onto California’s grid.”169 This approach is applied to both 
importers of electricity and in-state entities, thus including all emissions consumed within 
                                                          
167 Hong & Slatick, supra note 161. 
168 ARB, Market Advisory Committee, supra note 143, at H-54. 
169 Proposed Regulation Order, Appendix A, § 95811(b). 
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California’s borders.  Using a first deliverer approach ensures a higher level of 
environmental integrity, but may be implemented at the cost of administrative burden in 
defending against possible constitutional concerns. The first deliverer of imported 
electricity is subject to different thresholds for both specified and unspecified electricity 
under the proposed regulation vis-à-vis in-state generators. Application of the threshold is 
further differentiated between specified and unspecified electricity. As explained below, this 
may violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
 ARB is faced with a policymaking obstacle – AB 32 directs ARB to regulate all 
emissions from both imported and in-state sources.170 However, establishment of a 
threshold amount of emissions for imported electricity is extremely difficult. In-state 
sources are easily regulated under the threshold policy – after the generator emits the 
amount of the set threshold, it is covered under the cap and trade regime.171 For importers 
of electricity, the threshold becomes more difficult because importers of electricity often 
deal with many different sources of electricity. The threshold approach is simply not a good 
fit for the montage of electricity sources that California faces from its imported electricity. 
The boundaries of California and its cap and trade regime do not match the boundaries of 
the electricity grid, and yet the threshold approach ignores California’s boundaries and 
extends its jurisdiction to out-of-state generators. ARB chose an approach which focuses on 
the out-of-state generators’ total emissions, and which also may implicate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. Ironically, California’s frustration with the national standstill on cap 
and trade policy might involve an area that the Supreme Court has interpreted to be left to 
national jurisdiction (Congress). Although the national level is failing, an attempt at the 
                                                          
170 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §38505(m), §38550. 
171 California’s Senate Bill 1368 also makes this threshold requirement easier, as it already 
established greenhouse gas emission performance standards for utilities. CAL. PUB. UTIL. D. 4.1 Ch. 
3. 
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state level to proceed in the absence of national action is confronted with federalism 
concerns. 
1. Covered Entities: First Deliverers of Electricity 
 The proposed regulation chooses its point of regulation to be the first deliverers of 
electricity.172 For electricity generated within California’s borders, the regulation would be 
applied to generators. For electricity generated outside of California’s borders but consumed 
within them, the regulation would apply to “electricity importers.”173 These entities include 
electrical distribution utilities that sell electricity to retail customers and marketers that 
buy and sell in the wholesale electricity market.174  First deliverers of electricity are 
responsible for deliveries of both specified and unspecified electricity delivered to the 
California grid.175  
 The threshold for a generating facility in-state is 25,000 metric tons of CO2 
equivalent (“CO2 e”) per data year.176 For electricity importers of specified sources of 
electricity, the threshold is “based on the annual emissions of the electricity generating 
facility from which the imported electricity originated. The threshold for an electricity 
importer from a specified source which emits 25,000 metric tons of CO2 e per year is 
zero.”177 ARB’s regulation sets the threshold for out-of-state unspecified sources of 
electricity at zero.178 ARB’s threshold for entities covered in-state and out-of-state is likely 
                                                          
172 Proposed Regulation Order, Appendix A, § 95811(b). 
173 Id.  
174 Staff Report at II-12. 
175 Id. 
176 Proposed Regulation Order, Appendix A, § 95812(b)(2)(A). 
177 Id. at (b)(2)(B). The threshold for electricity importers of both unspecified and specified sources of 
electricity becomes zero starting January 1, 2015. This is because all natural gas fuel sources in-
state are also covered under the regulation starting in 2015 such that all emissions from in-state 
electricity will also be directly or indirectly covered. Id. at (d)(2). This makes in-state and out-of-state 
electricity coverage in effect the same (though maybe not worded to look like they are applied the 
same). 
178 Id. at (b)(2)(C). 
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not discriminatory per se but might be in its effects on interstate commerce. The basic 
framework for any infringements on the Commerce Clause follows.  
1. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis 
 The Commerce Clause in the Constitution states that: “[The Congress shall have 
power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian tribes.”179 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to also mean that the 
Commerce Clause prevents states from taking actions which improperly burdens or 
discriminates against interstate commerce, even if Congress has not actually exercised its 
power in the area. This is to keep states from acting out of interests related to “economic 
protectionism.”180 The Court has created a two-tiered approach to state economic 
regulation.181  Per se invalid state statutes directly regulate or discriminate against 
interstate commerce. Where a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against 
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-
state interests, [the Court] has generally struck down the statute without further 
inquiry.”182 The statute will be invalidated unless the law “advances a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot adequately be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”183 
 The Court employs a more flexible balancing approach if the statute only indirectly 
affects interstate commerce. Where the statute “has only indirect effects on interstate 
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, [the Court] has examined whether the State's 
interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the 
                                                          
179 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
180 Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 106. 
181 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986) 
(citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 
(1925); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
182 Id. at 579. 
183 Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100-01 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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local benefits.”184 In that case, the statute will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”185 Ultimately, 
the “critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate 
activity.”186 
 Here, the Proposed Regulation clearly regulates interstate commerce because it is 
admittedly regulating out-of-state emissions that are consumed in-state.187 Yet, it probably 
does not discriminate against out-of-state commerce per se. The threshold for a generating 
facility in-state and a generating facility out-of-state are both 25,000 metric tons of CO2 e 
per year.188 Although the wording of the Proposed Regulation states that the threshold for 
specified sources of electricity which emits 25,000 metric tons of CO2 e per year is zero, the 
threshold is essentially the same for both in-state and out-of-state generators.189 There is no 
doubt that the threshold requirement imposes a burden on the regulated entity, as it puts 
that entity under the cap and trade system by which emissions are valued. Yet, California’s 
rule does cover imported, specified sources equally on the face in that both in-state and out-
of-state specified sources are covered if they generate 25, 000 metric tons CO2e per year or 
more.  Thus, although the regulation could be written in a less-discriminatory manner, it 
does not seem to discriminate per se against interstate commerce.  
Yet, if California’s regulation is seen as per se discriminatory towards interstate 
commerce, then the state would have to put forward a legitimate local purpose that cannot 
                                                          
184 Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
185 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
186 Id. 
187 Staff Report, IV-8. 
188 Proposed Regulation Order, Appendix A, § 95812(b)(2)(A). 
189 Id. at (b)(2)(B). The threshold for electricity importers of both unspecified and specified sources of 
electricity becomes zero starting January 1, 2015. This is because all natural gas fuel sources in-
state are also covered under the regulation starting in 2015 such that all emissions from in-state 
electricity will also be directly or indirectly covered. Id. at (d)(2). This makes in-state and out-of-state 
electricity coverage in effect the same (though maybe not worded to look like they are applied the 
same). 
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adequately be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”190 Whether ARB has 
nondiscriminatory alternatives is questionable – it is difficult to construct a threshold 
regime for out-of-state generators that does not run afoul of the Commerce Clause. 
However, ARB could possibly instead establish a threshold focused on the amount of 
electricity that the out-of-state generator puts onto the California grid. The court’s analysis 
would turn on the availability of such nondiscriminatory alternatives.  
Although unspecified imported electricity does seem to be treated differently than 
in-state sources in that there is a 0 metric ton CO2e threshold for them, it seems that the 
court would likely find that the threshold is advancing a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot adequately be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Because the 
electricity is unspecified, it is inherently impossible to impose any requirement on the 
specific generator creating that electricity.  
Yet, although the threshold regulation will likely be seen as treating generation in-
state and out-of-state evenhandedly, there could be indirect effects on interstate commerce 
from the way the threshold is applied. Electricity coming from specified, imported 
electricity could be given a higher burden in practice than in-state sources, assuming that 
not all electricity from out-of-state specified generators is consumed in California (thus the 
25,000 metric tons CO2e threshold is counting emissions from that generator which are not 
covered under the cap). Hence, the total effect of that generator within the California 
market would be less than 25,000 metric tons of CO2 e per year, but the electricity 
originating from that generator that is consumed in California would be covered.    
This is perhaps made clearer by the following table on the threshold requirements. 
Entity Threshold: metric tons CO2e 
emitted 
Threshold effect: metric 
tons CO2e/year emitted in 
California’s market 
                                                          
190 Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100-01 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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In-state generator 25,000 metric tons CO2e 25,000 metric tons CO2e 
Electricity Importer: Specified 
Source Electricity from an out-
of-state generator emitting 
25,000 metric tons CO2e 
outside of the cap 
25,000 metric tons CO2e 
(becomes 0 metric tons CO2e 
per year in 2015) 
>0 metric tons CO2e 
Electricity Importer: 
Unspecified Source of 
Electricity 
0 metric tons CO2e >0 metric tons CO2e 
Table 1: Thresholds for California’s proposed cap and trade program for in-state versus out-of-state generators. 
  For example, a generator located inside of California’s border that emits 24,000 
metric tons CO2e would not be subject to regulation under the cap and trade system.  Yet, a 
generator located outside of California which exports electricity to California that results in 
24,000 metric tons CO2e but also contributes electricity within its own state that results in 
another 1,000 metric tons CO2e would be covered. Although both generators contribute 
24,000 metric tons CO2e to California’s cap and trade system, the out-of-state generator 
would be regulated and the in-state generator would not.  This effect is boosted by the fact 
that California’s regulation reads that the threshold for out of state, specified sources of 
power that emit more than 25,000 metric tons CO2e is zero, while the threshold for in-state 
sources is stated as 25,000 metric tons CO2e.191 
 If the threshold requirements are seen as evenhanded and not per se discriminatory, 
then the threshold requirements on out-of-state generation are likely to be upheld. The 
balancing approach for a regulation that has only an indirect effect on interstate commerce 
would be much more deferential to California. California’s interest in regulating emissions 
in order to mitigate climate change would likely be legitimate and the burden on interstate 
commerce probably does not clearly exceed the local benefits. There is still an issue with 
differential treatment of specified electricity from out-of-state generators because California 
                                                          
191 Proposed Regulation Order, Appendix A, § 95812(b)(2)(A). 
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could instead impose a 25,000 metric ton CO2e threshold on the amount of electricity from 
that generator imported into California, but the more flexible balancing approach that the 
court uses for this effect on interstate commerce allows California considerable leeway in 
proving the burden on interstate commerce doesn’t clearly exceed the local benefits.  
This is especially true in examining any protectionist concerns that are prevalent 
throughout Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. California’s regulation should be 
protecting some in-state entity from out-of-state competition in order to actually implicate 
the concerns of the Dormant Commerce Clause, and it is unclear whether in-state 
generation will actually benefit from the different thresholds and effects set forth in 
California’s Proposed Regulation. If generators of specified, imported electricity are able to 
show that the threshold’s effect makes them more readily included into the cap and trade 
program than California’s in-state generators, it is possible that they would have a case 
(though the flexible balancing approach of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis would 
probably weigh against them). This would require data on how many generators in 
California are left out from the threshold versus those out of state generators left out. The 
entire analysis seems moot once all generation is encompassed starting in 2015 (though 
again, that threshold is worded and applied differently192, its impacts seem to be applied 
equally to both in and out-of-state generators). 
 Regardless of the probability of success, ARB is clearly left to grapple with a messy 
solution at the outset while creating its cap and trade system. California has made it clear 
that it wants a cap and trade system of environmental integrity where all emissions that it 
consumes count under the cap, yet many of those emissions originate outside of the state’s 
                                                          
192 The threshold for electricity importers of both unspecified and specified sources of electricity 
becomes zero starting January 1, 2015 in order to accommodate the full coverage of natural gas fuel 
sources in-state starting in 2015. This applies equally in that all emissions from in-state electricity 
will also be indirectly covered. Id. at (d)(2).  
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jurisdictional reach. Yet, the worth of any cap and trade program is not in the program 
itself, but its effects on emissions and the efficiency of its market. ARB must be able to 
ensure these effects are assured before implementing the program, which requires a great 
deal of caution and resources at the outset, but this is necessary in order to ensure the 
program has a chance at success in operating under a much larger electricity grid and 
national economy. The ultimate decision on policy requires a delicate dance to include out-
of-state electricity within the purview of its proposed cap and trade system.  Before ARB 
can even begin to determine the intricate details of its cap and trade system, it must first 
defend against constitutional concerns for its choice of threshold for coverage under the cap 
and trade system.  This is valuable time lost – a sort of opportunity cost for administrators. 
The sub-regional system is inherently imperfectly overlain onto the nation’s regulatory, 
legal, and electrical system, and the policymakers are left to pay for this in time and 
resources. 
E. Linkage with the Western Climate Initiative 
 Linkage to external greenhouse gas emissions trading systems is allowed under the 
proposed ARB regulation193 and the Initial Statement of Reasons states that the program’s 
design is meant to link to the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”) in order to “create a 
regional market system.”194 ARB is especially interested in linkage to a regional cap and 
trade system because of its ability to reduce the risk of emissions leakage.195  The Western 
Climate Initiative is the strongest possibility for such linkage as it is the closest in 
proximity to California’s program, but it is not on track to be implemented by its current 
start date in 2015 in large part due to the Governor turn-over in many of the participating 
                                                          
193 Proposed Regulation Order, Appendix A, §§ 95940-43. 
194 Staff Report, ES-1. 
195 Id. at II-43. 
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states after the November 2010 elections.196 It currently involves seven “partner” states in 
the west, six “observer” states, four “partner” Canadian territories, one “observer” Canadian 
territory, and six Mexican states.197 This expansive regime would greatly enhance 
California’s administrative efficiency – the program would cover ninety percent of the 
region’s emissions.198  
1. WCI Overview 
The Western Climate Initiative is a joint strategy of seven U.S. states and four 
Canadian provinces to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through 15 percent below 2005 
levels by 2020.199 This greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal is derived from the sum of 
emissions goals of the partner jurisdictions.200 The WCI began with a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2007 signed by the Governors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon 
and Washington establishing the Western Climate Initiative.201 The undertaking, if 
successful, would cover 19% of the total U.S. population202 and 90% of the total emissions 
located under the cap203. It would operate as a broader program composed of individual cap-
and-trade programs through state and provincial regulations.204 Each jurisdiction would 
issue emission allowances sufficient to meet its jurisdictional-specific goal, with the total 
                                                          
196 Western Climate Initiative, Program Design, http://westernclimateinitiative.org/designing-the-
program. 
197 Western Climate Initiative, WCI Partners and Observers, http://westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-
partners-and-observers-map. More information on the Western Climate Initiative is discussed infra. 
198 Staff Report at I-5. 
199 WCI, Program Design, supra note 196. (U.S. states are Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, 
Utah, New Mexico, and Montana).  
200 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN SUMMARY 8 (2010). Some jurisdictions remain as 
“observers,” including six U.S. states, two Canadian provinces, and six Mexican states. WCI, 
Partners and Observers, supra note 197. (U.S. states include Alaska, Nevada, Idaho, Colorado, 
Wyoming, and Kansas). 
201 Memorandum of Understanding Establishing the Western Climate Initiative, Feb. 26, 2007. 
202 WCI, DESIGN SUMMARY supra note 200, at 3. 
203 Id. at 5. 
204 Id. at 6. 
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number of allowances adding up to the “cap” of the whole program.205 The program is set to 
begin on January 1, 2012 for the jurisdictions’ largest sources of emissions, including 
electricity and industrial sources, and to expand in 2015 to cover providers of 
transportation fuels and residential and commercial fuels, although it is not currently on 
track to hit either deadline.206  
2. Policies to Address Emissions Leakage  
 California and the WCI have largely the same approach to emissions leakage. WCI 
also intends to include electricity generated outside the cap but consumed within it to be 
included in the program through a First Jurisdictional Deliverer approach.207 WCI states 
that this choice was made because, “[d]ue to the interconnected nature of the electric grid, 
leakage of electricity emissions to jurisdictions or entities that are not part of the WCI is a 
significant concern that the First Jurisdictional Deliverer point of regulation is intended to 
address.”208 Also similar to California, the emissions from imported electricity would be 
divided into specified and unspecified imports. Unlike California, emissions from unknown 
sources would be determined through a default emissions calculator, where all generators 
in an area “are identified along with their recent historical emissions.”209 WCI’s proposed 
default emissions calculator would be calculated by using detailed information on many 
factors including generator types, capacities, quantities of fuel consumed, and net 
generation produced.210  
                                                          
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 8. 
207 Id. at 15 (this is the same approach California is using for its cap and trade program). 
208 WCI, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 75, at 22. 
209WCI, DESIGN SUMMARY, supra note 202, at 16.  
210 WCI, DEFAULT EMISSIONS CALCULATOR – ANNOUNCEMENT AND DESCRIPTION 2 (2009). The default 
emissions factor is derived by assigning facilities to either a marginal or non-marginal category. It 
then divides total emissions by the total net generation of all marginal sources. Id. Plants are 
considered non-marginal if they are Combined Heat Power units or used renewable energy sources. 
59 
 
 
 
3. Emissions Leakage Effects in the WCI 
 Currently nearly all coal-fired power within the WCI region is specified211,  but 
similar concerns of California’s cap-and-trade system are expressed in the WCI that coal-
fired power could find incentives to become “unspecified” if the deemed emissions factor for 
unspecified imported power is closer to natural gas emissions. Indeed, WCI admits that 
“even under the best regulatory strategy, it may not be possible to guarantee that currently 
specified coal generation will remain specified power in the future.”212  Undoubtedly, the 
larger spatial coverage of the system would certainly reduce emissions leakage concerns – 
to the extent that the states can incorporate a cap and trade system into their own 
legislative system.  However, despite the efforts of WCI, its prospects for a full-scale 
program start in 2012 seem to be dwindling.213  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Id. Fossil fuel-based plants (non-CHP) are considered marginal only if their capacity factor was 
below 60%. Id.  
211 WCI, ELECTRICITY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 15. 
212 Id. Although implementation of WCI would greatly reduce emissions leakage concerns of 
California in relation to its own cap and trade program, some economists have found that leakage of 
emissions in the electricity sector under WCI is still a “significant concern.” JAMES BUSHNELL & 
YIHSU CHEN, REGULATION, ALLOCATION, AND LEAKAGE IN CAP-AND-TRADE MARKETS FOR CO2, 3 
(2009).  An analysis performed for the WCI found that 16% of the energy produced by generators 
within WCI jurisdictions use coal, but over 50% of non-WCI generation is expected to come from coal. 
WCI, ELECTRICITY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 10. See Figure 6, Appendix. Further, 
imported electricity is expected to account for 26% of the electricity sector’s emissions under the WCI 
cap. Id. at 14.  This is a significant portion or the electricity, and could indicate the ability for outside 
sources to increase the amount of generation imported under the cap if prices of electricity under the 
cap are high enough. However, a report performed for the WCI found very limited ability of 
increased operation of coal generation, as those units are already operating at full capacity. Id. at 34. 
Some leakage could occur through natural gas generation, but that could be mitigated by providing a 
deemed emission rate at or just above the emissions intensity of an average natural gas plant. Id.  
213 Out of the seven U.S. states that signed up to the Initiative, only California is on track to have an 
enforceable cap and trade program in place by 2012. Simon Lomax, Western U.S., Canadian Carbon 
Market Faces Scaled-Back Start, Bloomberg Businessweek, June 07, 2010 (citing Tim Cheung, an 
analyst with Bloomberg New Energy Finance), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-
07/western-u-s-canadian-carbon-market-faces-scaled-back-start.html. Oregon and Washington failed 
to get cap and trade bills passed before their legislative sessions ended in 2010. Oregon, Washington 
Fail to Pass Bills to Participate in Regional Cap-and-Trade Program, Power News, Aug. 10, 2010, 
http://www.powermag.com/POWERnews/Oregon-Washington-Fail-to-Pass-Bills-to-Participate-in-
Regional-Cap-and-Trade-Program_2966.html. Yet, if WCI is eventually implemented, the size of a 
program would be three times the size of RGGI, and could affect huge portions of industry in the 
West. WCI, ELECTRICITY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 15. 
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4. WCI: Conclusion 
 WCI has the potential to implement a large, regional cap and trade system with a 
much broader coverage than RGGI.  Yet, the program could be undermined by its goal of 
creating a larger, more inclusive cap because the several states involved may not be able to 
instigate cap and trade legislation in time for the WCI program to be put into place by 
2012. The sheer effort that has already been put into the WCI exemplifies the difficulty of 
getting a program that expands over state boundaries into place – it began in February, 
2007 and seems to be well off its timeline to be implemented by 2012. The excessively long 
planning period exemplifies the difficulty and disconnect between executive aspirations and 
administrative implementation.  Yet, the time and effort spent to manage emissions 
leakage under the WCI seems to be lessened because of the broader coverage, and the 
WCI’s emissions calculator used to determine the default emissions factor  for unspecified, 
imported electricity seems to be a more accurate and efficient tool than California’s 
approach. Regardless, if WCI is eventually put into place, it would clearly be a success for 
climate change legislation in the United States and could be as close to a solution for 
emissions leakage that California can get. Aside from Nevada, which remains an observer 
state in the WCI, every other state directly adjacent to California would theoretically be 
involved in the WCI.214 Yet, California cannot rely solely on linkage to the WCI as an 
emissions leakage solution because progress on implementation of the WCI seems to be 
stalled. It is also not clear whether Nevada will continue to hold out on joining the WCI as a 
partner, so California will have to construct its cap and trade policy with concerns for 
emissions leakage regardless of current WCI standings. 
F. ARB Cap and Trade Proposal: Conclusion 
                                                          
214 WCI Partners and Observers, supra note 197. 
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 A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of ARB’s policy choices to attack 
emissions leakage in the electricity sector cannot escape a broader, more basic question: 
Should these measures even be considered at the beginning of ARB’s policymaking process 
for its cap and trade program?  It is unclear how much emissions leakage will actually occur 
in California under a cap and trade policy, but California’s use of precaution in proceeding 
will likely be rewarded in the future under the program.  Especially because there is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding the amount of possible emissions leakage in the 
future and surrounding the possibility that the Western Climate Initiative will become a 
reality in the future, California’s policymakers should use precaution to guide them in 
balancing between the administrative resources used upfront against the integrity of the 
program and emissions reduced in the future.  This is made even more complex in that the 
“costs” associated with emissions leakage include environmental integrity of the cap, on 
which it is difficult to place a monetary value. Ultimately, ARB must determine how 
important it is to its sub-national cap and trade market to devote time and administrative 
costs now for a problem that might never be a true cost to the policy. In this case, a messy 
climate change problem is approached with a wicked solution. Yet, California has a unique 
opportunity that RGGI and the WCI were not able to take advantage of – it is composed of 
only one state’s legislature that has already given it authority to create a climate change 
program, coupled with an order to include imported electricity. RGGI and WCI are plagued 
with the problem of coordinating multiple state legislatures into agreement for the 
program, which is likely a big reason why RGGI ended up using a wait-and-see emissions 
leakage policy, and why the WCI is nowhere near meeting its timeline. 
Thus, ARB is smart to utilize the power it has in implementing a program within 
only one state’s borders and cautiously create a program that, as best as ARB can, works to 
correct emissions leakage from the beginning. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 International negotiations have failed to deliver any meaningful reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, but the world agrees that climate change is absolutely a pressing 
issue that must be addressed.  Sub-national programs that are implemented in the face of 
these stalemates are faced with significant cost-effective hurdles to the imperfectness of the 
programs’ coverage. In the face of such efficiency hurdles, sub-national policymakers have 
to brace for significant administrative resources invested in the beginning of creating such 
programs in order to ensure the program’s environmental and structural integrity is not 
compromised. The quantity of administrative resources used at the outset is tempered by 
the judgment of policymakers, and the delicate balancing of administrative efficiency and 
environmental integrity must be acknowledged and discussed by policymakers.  
Although RGGI chose not to use precaution and invest significant resources in 
relation to emissions leakage issues, it has survived due to an extremely low price on 
carbon (and also gambled on a better, more efficient national scheme). Perhaps the better 
method is to instead adopt something similar to California’s approach, which utilizes 
precaution and extensive administrative resources to proactively plan for emissions leakage 
at the outset of the program in order to prevent the need for an overhaul of the program 
once in operation. The significant obstacles involved – tracking electricity, carefully 
stepping around FERC’s wholesale power authority, and incorporating imported electricity 
into the program – are all unfortunate consequences of overlaying a cap and trade program 
on top of an extremely interconnected national electricity grid, and California exemplifies 
the intricate difficulties in enacting a policy that can navigate around each obstacle without 
a legal challenge. By highlighting the need for significant administrative resources upfront, 
the precaution requisite in balancing administrative resources against environmental 
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integrity, and the possible consequences of a passive versus proactive approach to emission 
leakage for being ineffective, this paper attempts to help guide policymakers as they 
struggle through the process of creating sub-national cap and trade programs.  
The ability of policymakers to translate a sub-national cap and trade program into an 
enforceable, effective policy that can operate within a national economy will largely depend 
on the way that they are able to assess and incorporate such guidance into the cap and 
trade program.  
 Lastly, it is important to note that these policies, whether flawed or not, are leading 
the way for other entities to learn from and create their own cap and trade programs, and 
this in itself is valuable. Perhaps it is this benefit that makes the administrative resources 
lost and inefficiencies created from creating an “imperfect” regulatory scheme valuable to 
society. It is indeed the pioneers that must cover the rockiest ground and break the most 
axles before the population can follow their path. Here, sub-national policymakers mapping 
their cap and trade programs onto a subset of the United States’ economy seem to be just as 
bravely forging such a path, no matter the efficiencies lost or emissions reduced. 
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Figure 1. A map of the United States’ transmission networks. Celsius, Smarter Grids, Appliances and 
Consumers, http://www.celsias.com/article/smarter-grids-appliances-and-consumers/. 
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Figure 2: SmartGridApp, North American Regional Reliability Councils, 
http://smartgridapp.com/2010/02/north-american-regional-reliability-councils/. 
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Figure 3: Map of existing ISOs/RTOs in the U.S. ISO/RTC Council, ISO RTO Operating Regions, 
http://www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2604471/k.B14E/Map.htm. 
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Figure 4. Power Path for Electricity Imports in California. California Energy Commission, Apr. 2006, 
www.energy.ca.gov. 
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Figure 5. Monthly generation in California by fuel type in 2009 on the spot market. CALIFORNIA ISO, ANNUAL 
REPORT ON MARKET ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE 2.11 (2010). 
 
 
Figure 6. Differences in fuel type by 2020 in WCI and non-WCI jurisdictions, demonstrating the opportunity for 
emissions leakage under the WCI cap. WCI, ELECTRICITY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT 11 (2009). 
